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ALLOCATING POWER: TOWARD A NEW
FEDERALISM BALANCE FOR ELECTRICITY
TRANSMISSION SITING
Kevin Decker*
Expansion and improvement of the nation’s electricity transmission system are
crucial for increasing the amount of electricity generated by renewable energy
sources.1 Renewable energy sources, such as wind and tidal, tend to be located far
from population centers, and electricity transmission lines must bridge that gap.2
In addition to its importance for meeting renewable energy goals, a better
connected and more robust transmission system also bolsters reliability because it
can draw on many generation sources in the event that a generator or segment of
the transmission network fails. 3 And transmission facilitates generator competition
by making it possible to transport lower-cost electricity from one part of the
country to another area with higher electricity prices.4
Unfortunately, the current regulatory regime for siting transmission facilities
has proven to be a barrier to needed transmission development. Historically, states
have authority over physical siting of transmission lines whereas the federal
government and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have had
jurisdiction over the actual interstate transmission and sale of electricity. This
division of power still exists today, despite recent legislative and regulatory
attempts to overcome the limitations of the current federalism balance. With a
focus on transmission challenges in Maine and New England, this Comment
explores the current regulatory model and its balance of power between the federal
and state governments and evaluates solutions proposed by commentators.
The need for transmission is especially critical to meet New England’s future
renewable energy goals.5 And this need may be more pressing than previously
thought. The transmission grid operation for New England, ISO-NE, sent a
memorandum to its stakeholders in June 2013 explaining that transmission
constraints made it necessary to curtail output from wind generators.6 The
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maine School of Law. The Author thanks his colleagues on
the Maine Law Review for their tireless assistance and valuable suggestions. The Author is also grateful
to Sarah Tucker for her patience and support.
1. See Michael Dworkin et al., Energy Transmission and Storage, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY:
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 531, 546 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011). A recent study by Stanford
researchers concluded that it was feasible for New York State to rely completely on renewable energy in
the coming decades, but this would require expedited transmission development. Mark Z. Jacobson et
al., Examining the Feasibility of Converting New York State’s All-Purpose Energy Infrastructure to One
Using Wind, Water, and Sunlight, 57 ENERGY POL’Y 585, 598-99 (2013).
2. See Dworkin, supra note 1, at 546.
3. See MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO, NAT'L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POL’Y,
ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION: A PRIMER 7-11 (2004).
4. See id.
5. NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., EASTERN WIND INTEGRATION AND TRANSMISSION STUDY
27 (rev. 2011) [hereinafter EWITS].
6. Memorandum from Eric Wilkinson, External Affairs, ISO-NE, to New England Stakeholders
(June 28, 2013), http://www.iso-ne.com/pubs/pubcomm/corr/2013/curtailment_summary_2013.pdf
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memorandum noted that there were 700 megawatts of installed wind energy
capacity at the start of 2013 and that another 2,053 megawatts of capacity were in
the study pipeline.7 These new generation facilities tend to be located near weaker,
lower voltage (e.g., 115 kV) transmission lines, “in areas with the least robust
transmission facilities” that were “not designed to accommodate the addition of
generation sources or the movement of large amounts of power.”8
Much of the academic literature on electricity transmission focuses on
Midwestern and Western states.9 This is understandably so, given the potential for
renewable energy generation in those locations and the comparatively greater
distances between generation sites and cities.
This Comment addresses
transmission challenges generally, but also focuses on the regulatory regimes in
Maine and other New England states. Also, unlike most Western states, states in
the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions belong to Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs), which present different challenges and solutions.10
The present shortfall of transmission capacity is in part attributable to a
mismatch between an early twentieth century regulatory framework and twentyfirst century problems. Part I of this Comment begins with a sketch of the
historical development of the electricity industry and its regulators, in order to
comprehend and diagnose the current regulatory challenges confronting
transmission development. Part II then turns to state regulation of electricity
transmission in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.
[hereinafter Wilkinson Memo]. See also Wilson Ring & David Sharp, Wind Power Systems Hit Hurdles,
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/08/08/challenge-for-wind-powercan-reaching-customers/FYloeNteh7ZliwZuEesgPL/story.html; Tux Turkel, Inadequate Transmission
Lines Keeping Some Maine Wind Power Off The Grid, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 4, 2013,
http://www.pressherald.com/news/there-is-a-problem-withwind-power-in-maine_2013-08-04.html.
7. Wilkinson Memo, supra note 6.
8. Id. The constraints on the New England electricity grid and their effect on energy generation
mirror constraints on the region’s natural gas transmission system. Many policymakers see natural gas
as making renewables less favorable in the short term or as a bridge fuel source between other fossil
fuels and renewable energy, but as recently as the winter of 2012-2013 New England experienced
problems with natural gas pipeline congestion and scarcity. See Grid Chief Warns of New England
Power Issues, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Mar. 19, 2013, http://www.pressherald.com/news/Grid-chiefwarns-of-future-NE-power-problems.html; Matthew L. Wald, In New England, a Natural Gas Trap,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/business/electricity-costs-up-in-gasdependent-new-england.html. Gordon van Welie, President and CEO of ISO-New England, testified
before the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power that New England’s natural gas pipeline
infrastructure is inadequate to accommodate the region’s increased reliance on natural gas as an
electricity source. Testimony of Gordon van Welie, H. Subcomm. on Energy & Power, American
Energy Security and Innovation: The Role of Regulators and Grid Operators in Meeting Natural Gas
and Electric Coordination Challenges (March 19, 2013), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/
IF/IF03/20130319/100527/HHRG-113-IF03-Wstate-vanWelieG-20130319-U1.pdf. Van Welie noted
that utilities have retired coal and nuclear power plants in favor of natural gas fired plants and that New
England now derives fifty-two percent of its electricity from natural gas. Id.
9. See, e.g., Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in A Changed Milieu:
Evolving Notions of the "Public Interest" in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO.
L. REV. 705 (2010).
10. See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO)—
Industries, Electric, Industry Activities, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Aug. 28, 2013). For the FERC
order creating RTOs see Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000).
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After canvassing the history leading up to the current transmission regulatory
structure, Part III of this Comment turns to defining the federalism problem
confronting electricity transmission. The overlapping jurisdiction between states,
regional entities, and the federal government over transmission cost allocation,
planning, and siting creates numerous opportunities for interested parties to delay
or even kill a transmission project. Part III explores this problem with several
theories of administrative regulation and federalism. Part IV then analyzes FERC
Order 100011 as an attempt to address this problem.
Although on the whole Order 1000 seems like a step toward a better regulatory
scheme for electricity transmission planning, it is far from a total solution. Even if
it addressed issues involved with cost allocation and planning, barriers to siting
planned and funded transmission projects would still exist. Part IV, therefore,
critically evaluates potential solutions suggested by commentators. The first
solution is simple and blunt—avoid the localized interests and collective action
problems that stymie transmission development by completely preempting state
authority over transmission siting.12 The second, more moderate approach is
coordinated13 or process preemption, in which states retain decision-making
authority cabined by federally-defined standards and procedures.14 A third solution
would allow states to retain authority over transmission siting approval, but
increase the FERC’s limited “backstop” authority to intervene in the event of state
delay, recalcitrance, or even denial. A fourth solution is for states to reform their
process for siting transmission projects.15 In the end, however, a fifth approach is
perhaps the best solution: vesting siting authority in Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) or regional transmission planning entities. Finally, potential
state-level reforms are considered, especially reforms that Western states have
adopted.16 Part V concludes.
I. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY AND ITS REGULATION
Generation, transmission, and distribution are the three primary components of
the electricity industry.17 Generators produce electricity from various fuel sources,
including coal, natural gas, nuclear energy, dams, and, more recently, wind, solar,
and tidal energy.18 Once generated, the transmission system transports electricity

11. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Order 1000].
12. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Preempting Parochialism and Protectionism in Power, 49 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 87, 123-28 (2012).
13. See JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW 215 (2005).
14. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 289, 321 (2011); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges
for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1865 (2012).
15. See ROSSI, supra note 13, at 219-20.
16. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9.
17. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 262 (2004). See
SALLY HUNT, MAKING COMPETITION WORK IN ELECTRICITY 17-23 (2002).
18. HUNT, supra note 17, at 17-18; Sources of Energy—Energy Explained, What Is Energy, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=about_sources_of_energy
(last updated Aug. 1, 2013).
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from power plants to local distribution systems.19 The unique physical properties
of electricity make managing the transmission system a delicate process.20
Generally it is not possible to deliver specific electrons from a generator to a
particular customer because electricity flows over the path of least resistance, not
where we tell it to go.21 This makes an agreement between a customer and
generator to purchase electricity a legal fiction—the electricity the customer
receives could come from anywhere on the network.22 If the amount of electricity
generated into the transmission system does not match load, a blackout can occur.23
The physical limitations of a transmission network can lead to congestion, which
limits the amount of electricity that can travel between two points.24
Despite its delicacy, the transmission system fulfills several crucial functions
besides simply carrying electrons from one location to another. An interconnected
transmission system can draw on many generation sources and bolsters the
reliability of the system in the event that a generator or segment of the transmission
network fails.25 Transmission also facilitates generator competition by making it
possible to transport lower-cost electricity from one part of the country to another
area with higher electricity prices.26 And, of course, transmission is critical for
connecting far-flung renewable energy sources in remote locations to population
centers.27
The complexity of the transmission system means that it requires careful
management to avoid malfunction. System operators orchestrate the process by
dispatching various generators to match demand.28 In New England, ISO New
England (ISO-NE) handles system operation, among other functions.29
The third aspect of the electricity system is distribution.30 The distinction
between transmission and distribution is not always clear, but generally distribution
refers to the wires that connect to and deliver electricity to residential, commercial,
and industrial customers.31 Distribution also includes customer service functions,
billing, and metering.32
Finally, there is also a distinction between wholesale and retail sales of
electricity.33 Retail sales are sales to end-users of electricity, whereas wholesale in
this context means sales for resale.34 Though this distinction may seem trivial, it
forms one of the boundaries between state and federal jurisdiction over electricity
19. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 262.
20. See HUNT, supra note 17, at 30-32.
21. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 29-30.
22. See id. at 30.
23. HUNT, supra note 17, at 32.
24. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 31-32.
25. Id. at 8-9.
26. Id. at 10-11.
27. Id. at 9. See EWITS., supra note 5, at 27.
28. See HUNT, supra note 17, at 20-21.
29. See Overview—About ISO-NE, Company Profile, ISO NEW ENG., http://www.iso-ne.com/
aboutiso/co_profile/overview/index.html (last visited Sep. 14, 2013).
30. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 262.
31. See id. at 263.
32. See HUNT, supra note 17, at 23.
33. See id. at 23-24.
34. Id. at 23-24.
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sales, as discussed in the next section.35
Given the complexity, delicacy, and importance of the electricity system, it is
hardly surprising that the industry attracted regulation. The system’s complexity
compounds the challenge of drawing legal distinctions and jurisdictional lines, and
the century-long history of electricity industry regulation is defined by a struggle to
draw these lines.
A. A Century of Growing Federal Regulation of Electricity Transmission
For the first fifty years of its existence, the electricity industry attracted little
regulation.36 Technological constraints forced the first power plants in the 1880s to
be located a short distance from customers, which initially produced a
decentralized model for the electricity system, with many small power plants
dispersed throughout an urban area.37 As advances in transmission technology
allowed transportation of electricity over greater distances and the holding
company corporate form attracted investors, the electricity industry underwent
rapid consolidation in the early 1900s.38 As economies of scale allowed larger
electric companies to dominate the industry, those companies became perceived by
state regulators as natural monopolies requiring regulation to avoid abuse.39
According to historian Robert Hirsh, at least some in the electric industry
welcomed regulation as a monopoly because the regulation protected them from
competition while also guaranteeing a reasonable return on investment.40 In the
1930s, the electricity industry consisted primarily of vertically-integrated, investorowned utilities,41 although there were also some municipally-controlled power
companies.42 State and local governments were the primary regulators for these
utilities.43
Yet state regulation of electric utilities ran into a problem—the dormant
Commerce Clause limited states’ authority to regulate electricity sold interstate.44
In Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.,
decided in 1927, the United States Supreme Court held that states could not
regulate interstate electricity sales.45 Rhode Island-based Narragansett Electric
Light Company had entered a twenty-year contract with Attleboro Steam &
Electric Company to provide, at a certain rate, electricity for distribution to the
Massachusetts city of Attleboro.46 After the cost of generating electricity
increased, Narragansett Company filed with the Rhode Island Public Utilities

35. See id. at 24
36. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 265-66.
37. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN
THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 12 (1999).
38. See id. at 34-36; TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 265-66.
39. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 20-23, 29-31.
40. See id. at 26-29, 33.
41. See HUNT, supra note 17, at 24-26.
42. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 14-15.
43. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002); HIRSH, supra note 37, at 26.
44. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5.
45. Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927).
46. Id. at 84.
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Commission (PUC) a new, increased rate schedule, which the PUC granted after
finding the old rate to be unreasonable.47 The Supreme Court held that the Rhode
Island PUC order granting the new rate was a direct burden on interstate
commerce, and that only Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate wholesale electricity transactions between states.48 The holding created
what became known as the Attleboro gap because states lacked authority to
regulate interstate sales and transmission of electricity, but Congress had not yet
exercised its authority over wholesale transactions and interstate transmission.49
The federal government began regulating the electricity industry in 1935.
First, it indirectly regulated the industry by passing the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA),50 which required utility holding companies to
register with the SEC and was intended to curb manipulation and abuse.51 The
PUHCA effectively confined utilities to operate within state lines and contributed
to the traditional model of a vertically-integrated public utility that controlled the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity within a state.52
Congress then created direct federal regulation of electricity transmission and
wholesale sales with the Federal Power Act of 1935 (“FPA”), 53 which amended
and expanded on the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 governing hydroelectric
dams.54 The Act created the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”), known today as
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), and Section 201(a) of the
FPA granted FERC jurisdiction over “transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”55
The newly created federal jurisdiction over interstate transmission and wholesale
transactions closed the Attleboro gap.56 Congress clearly circumscribed the
authority it granted to FERC, however, by clarifying that federal regulation of
electricity would “extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation
by the States.”57 Congress denied FERC, with some exceptions, jurisdiction over
generation and distribution facilities.58 The FPA thus drew a jurisdictional line
between, on the one hand, federal authority over interstate wholesale transactions
and transmission and, on the other, state authority over retail sales, distribution, and
the siting of generation and transmission facilities.59 This line defined a regulatory
47. Id. at 85-86.
48. Id. at 89-90.
49. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 267.
50. Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z) (repealed
2005).
51. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 266-67.
52. See id. at 266-67; BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 3.
53. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 847 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824w
(2006)).
54. Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791a – 823d (2006)).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006).
56. See id. § 824(b)(1); TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 267.
57. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
58. Id. § 824(b)(1) (“The Commission . . . shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the
generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of
electric energy in intrastate commerce.”).
59. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 3.
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status quo that only began to erode toward the end of the twentieth century.60
FERC exercises its authority under the FPA primarily by setting rates for
electricity. Section 205 of the FPA provides that utilities may charge only “just
and reasonable rates” for interstate transmission or sale of electricity.61 Nor may
public utilities confer “undue preference or advantage” in setting rates or charge an
unreasonable difference in rates between localities or types of service.62 Public
utilities must file a schedule of rates with FERC and give notice of any changes.
FERC may then hold a hearing to review the rates on its own initiative or upon a
complaint.63 Pursuant to Section 206 of the FPA, if FERC determines that a rate
was “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,” it must then
determine and fix a just and reasonable rate.64
Far from crippling the electricity industry, the FPA heralded several decades of
incredible growth in the electricity industry.65 According to Hirsh, utility
managers, manufacturers, consumers, regulators, and investors tacitly approved of
a “grow-and-build strategy” for the electricity industry, which led to a feedback
loop of lower prices and increased demand in the post-World War II decades.66
Incremental technological innovation gradually improved generation efficiency,
while electricity use by factories and consumers with their new household
appliances led to increased demand.67 These two factors led to consistent declines
in electricity prices, which kept customers and regulators happy.68 Meanwhile, the
regulated public utilities and their investors earned back their growth costs plus a
reasonable rate of return.69
The electricity industry at this time, regulated within the 1935 framework of
the FPA, built the foundation for the physical transmission system we have today.
The state-regulated, vertically-integrated monopolies built transmission facilities to
connect their newly-built generators to customers.70 Although some utilities
interconnected with each other to realize reliability and efficiency gains,71 public
utilities generally had little incentive to invite competition by building a wellintegrated transmission grid.72
The conditions for the public utility industry’s unraveling began to appear in
the 1960s. A combination of stagnant efficiency gains (due to thermodynamic
60. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 3-4.
61. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility
for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just
and reasonable.”).
62. Id. § 824d(b).
63. Id. § 824d(c)-(e).
64. Id. § 824e(a).
65. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 269.
66. HIRSH, supra note 37, at 46-50.
67. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 46-50.
68. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 46-50; TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 269.
69. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 49; TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 270.
70. See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39
ENVTL. L. 1015, 1018 (2009).
71. See ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40657, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION FACILITY SITING 2 (2010).
72. See Rossi, supra note 70, at 1018-19.
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properties of steam turbines), higher fuel costs, the advent of environmentalism and
the conservation movement, and insufficient generating capacity to meet demand
contributed to the decline in the traditional vertically-integrated public utility
model.73 At the same time, rising operating costs and huge capital investments in
long-delayed nuclear energy facilities forced public utilities to raise rates, which
created political pressure on state regulators and led to a drop in consumer
demand.74
Beginning in 1978, Congress laid the groundwork for a drastic change in the
electricity industry when it passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act
(PURPA).75 Among the goals of PURPA were conservation, increased efficiency,
reasonable ratemaking, and better wholesale distribution.76 Section 210 of PURPA
amended the FPA by requiring public utilities to purchase and resell power from
independent “qualifying facilities” (QFs).77 Prior to PURPA, public utilities
generally enjoyed a monopoly and could decline to purchase power from
independent power generation facilities.78 After PURPA’s passage, independent
companies could also generate and sell power created by qualifying cogeneration
or small-scale generation facilities.79 In implementing PURPA, FERC further
encouraged generator competition by requiring public utilities to purchase power
generated by QFs at the “avoided costs,” which meant the higher amount it would
have cost the public utility to generate the same energy.80 In addition, FERC had
the authority to exempt certain non-utility generators from provisions of the FPA
and PUHCA, which allowed for innovation in the financing and structure of
companies owning QFs.81
Although PURPA expanded federal regulation of electricity generation, states
retained broad authority in regulating electricity transmission. PURPA stopped
short of mandating state adoption of federal policy goals, in the form of federal
ratemaking standards, in the areas of energy efficiency and conservation.82 Instead,
under PURPA states were required only to “consider” the federal ratemaking
standards, and states could reject the standards after a formal hearing.83
In FERC v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court upheld the provision of PURPA
requiring states to consider federal ratemaking standards and the provision

73. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 55.
74. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 270-71.
75. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat 3117 [hereinafter
PURPA] (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-3, 2601-2642 and throughout other titles).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
77. Id. § 824a-3(a). See also HUNT, supra note 17, at 41-45 (explaining single-buyer market model
created by PURPA).
78. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750-51 (1982).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a). A cogeneration facility is one that produces electricity and “steam or
forms of useful energy (such as heat) which are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling
purposes,” id. § 796(18)(A), whereas a small power production facility is one that uses biomass, waste,
or renewable resources to produce electricity and has a capacity of no more than eighty megawatts, id.
§ 796(17)(A).
80. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2) (2013). See also HIRSH, supra note 37, at 89-91.
81. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.601-602; HIRSH, supra note 37, at 87.
82. PURPA, supra note 75, § 111(a).
83. Id.
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requiring public utilities to purchase electricity from QFs.84 The Court held that
these provisions did not violate the Commerce Clause, reasoning that Congress had
a rational basis for concluding that electricity generation and transmission had an
immediate effect on interstate commerce.85 In confronting a more difficult issue,
the Court also held that compelling states to consider federal ratemaking standards
did not violate the Tenth Amendment, reasoning that transmission regulation was a
pre-emptible field.86
Although Section 210 of PURPA attracted relatively little attention during the
legislative debate, it had far-reaching consequences for the structure of the
electricity industry and its regulation.87 PURPA opened the electricity generation
market to competition, but it also revealed regulatory problems regarding
transmission.88 Non-utility generators faced a product delivery problem: obtaining
fair access to the public utilities’ transmission network.89 To address this problem,
PURPA granted FERC the authority to issue orders that required public utilities to
provide transmission services to QFs, known as “wheeling” orders.90 PURPA
subjected FERC’s wheeling authority to a number of constraints, however,
including the requirement that the wheeling order maintain existing competitive
relationships and promote energy conservation.91 In addition, not all non-utility
generators met the definition of “qualifying facility,” and thus did not enjoy the
favorable provisions in PURPA.92
In partial response to this transmission access problem, Congress passed the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992).93 The Act created a new entity, the
Exempt Wholesale Generator (“EWG”), a category that encompassed independent
power producers that previously did not qualify for QF status, and exempted them
from PUHCA limitations on firm structure.94 EPAct 1992 also facilitated FERC’s
wheeling authority by eliminating the requirements that a wheeling order preserve
existing competitive relationships and promote energy conservation, although the
order still had to be in the public interest.95 Nonetheless, some limitations on
84. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745 (1982).
85. Id. at 755-56.
86. Id. at 771.
87. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 273-74.
88. See id. For a critical take on QFs and an argument that regulations requiring utilities to purchase
power from QFs led to much higher electricity prices, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process
of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 459 (2005).
89. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 273.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a) (2006) (“Any electric utility, Federal power marketing agency, or any other
person generating electric energy for sale for resale, may apply to the Commission for an order under
this subsection requiring a transmitting utility to provide transmission services (including any
enlargement of transmission capacity necessary to provide such services) to the applicant.”).
91. PURPA, supra note 75, § 203. See also TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 275-76.
92. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 275.
93. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in Title 16
and scattered titles of U.S.C.).
94. Id. § 711. The full definition of an Exempt Wholesale Generator is “any person determined by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to be engaged directly, or indirectly through one or more
affiliates . . . , and exclusively in the business of owning or operating, or both owning and operating, all
or part of one or more eligible facilities and selling electric energy at wholesale.” Id.
95. See 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a).
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FERC’s wheeling authority to order transmission access remained. For instance,
FERC still could not act until application by a party, although the EPAct 1992
added “any other person generating electric energy for sale for resale” to the
entities eligible to apply to FERC for a wheeling order.96 This limitation forced
FERC to open transmission access to non-utility generators on a case-by-case basis,
instead of setting a nationwide policy.
In order to implement EPAct 1992, and also to go beyond the Act by avoiding
the case-by-case limitation on its wheeling authority, FERC issued Order 888 in
1996.97 FERC’s stated goal in Order 888 was “to facilitate the development of
competitively priced generation supply options, and to ensure that wholesale
purchasers of electric energy can reach alternative power suppliers and vice
versa.”98 FERC acknowledged that, by itself, the case-by-case wheeling authority
under PURPA and EPAct 1992 was insufficient to secure open transmission access
across the country.99 To accomplish its goal, Order 888 required “all public
utilities that own, control or operate facilities used for transmitting electric energy
in interstate commerce . . . [t]o file open access non-discriminatory transmission
tariffs that contain minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory
service.”100 FERC intended that these open access transmission tariffs (OATTs)
would ensure transparent pricing and minimum terms for services that a
transmission utility “is reasonably capable of providing,” regardless of whether the
utility currently provides those services to itself.101
Order 888 also mandated “functional unbundling,” which required public
utilities to separately state wholesale generation and transmission rates and also to
take its own transmission services under the same tariff as it offered to others.102
But FERC stopped short of a corporate unbundling requirement that transmission
utilities divest generation facilities or create separate corporate affiliates for
transmission and generation.103 FERC did not require unbundling of retail
transmission and generation, but it did apply an open access requirement on retail
access that the utility had voluntarily unbundled.104
Unsurprisingly, public utilities and states challenged Order 888’s expansion of
federal regulation of transmission.105 After all, in enacting EPAct 1992, Congress
had increased FERC’s ability to issue wheeling orders but had not given FERC
broad authority to require open transmission access. Nonetheless, in New York v.
FERC the Supreme Court concluded that FERC had the legal authority to mandate
open transmission access and to require both retail and wholesale functional
96. Id.
97. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (April 24, 1996) [hereinafter Order 888]; reh’g, Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg.
12,274 (Mar. 4, 1997); reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (Nov. 25, 1997).
98. Order 888, supra note 97, at 21,547.
99. Id. at 21,547.
100. Id. at 21,541.
101. Id. at 21,572; see BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 5.
102. Order 888, supra note 97, at 21,552.
103. Id. at 21,551.
104. Id. at 21,571-72.
105. See VANN, supra note 71, at 7.
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unbundling.106 In Order 888107 and before the Court,108 FERC argued that its legal
authority to require open transmission access and functional unbundling was found
in its ratemaking authority pursuant to Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA to remedy
undue discrimination, and not the wheeling authority expanded in EPAct 1992.
New York argued that FERC lacked authority over retail transmissions, an area it
argued that Congress had left to the states.109 The Court agreed with FERC, noting
that “the landscape of the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the
FPA, when the electricity universe was ‘neatly divided into spheres of retail versus
wholesale sales.’”110 Retail transmission, as well as wholesale transmission, was
effectively interstate transmission “because of the nature of the grid.”111 The Court
reached its conclusion despite New York’s argument that legislative history
showed that Congress’s sole purpose in passing the FPA was to close the Attleboro
gap, that is, regulate interstate wholesale, not retail, transmission of electricity.112
The Court disagreed with New York’s reading of the legislative history while also
noting, “here [legislative history] is not particularly helpful because of the interim
developments in the electric industry.”113
In 1999, to further its goal of achieving open, non-discriminatory transmission
access, FERC issued Order 2000, which encouraged voluntary formation of
independent Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) to manage and
coordinate transmission, of which individual transmission utilities are members.114
FERC identified two transmission-related barriers to competitive wholesale
markets.115 First, “engineering and economic inefficiencies” resulted from
individual transmission owners making independent decisions about use and
expansion of the grid, even though the grid is actually part of one larger system.116
FERC noted that increased generation competition had strained the transmission
system.117 Second, FERC expressed concern about continued undue discrimination
by transmission owners in the services they provided to generation competitors.118
Even the appearance of discrimination impeded the competitiveness of the
market.119 FERC determined that RTOs would remedy these two barriers to
competition.120 Yet FERC decided to make participation in an RTO voluntary,
after most of the investor-owned utilities protested against mandatory
106. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2002).
107. Order 888, supra note 97 at 21,560.
108. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 11-13.
109. Id. at 16.
110. Id. (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir.
2000)).
111. Id. at 17.
112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. at 23.
114. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Order 2000].
115. Id. at 817.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (“It is in the economic self-interest of transmission monopolists, particularly those with highcost generation assets, to deny transmission or to offer transmission on a basis that is inferior to that
which they provide themselves.”).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 825.
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participation.121 FERC also declined to mandate a structure for an RTO, allowing
either non-profit independent system operators (ISOs) or for-profit Transco’s, or
some other form.122 Order 2000 set out four minimum characteristics123 and eight
minimum functions of an RTO.124 At present, there are seven RTOs in the United
States, including ISO-NE, which covers all six New England states.125
Despite increased federal regulation of wholesale electricity markets and
transmission planning, authority over transmission siting historically belonged to
the states, and for the most part it still does.126 But Congress granted FERC
authority over transmission siting when it passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(EPAct 2005).127 EPAct 2005 added Section 216 to the FPA, which granted FERC
backstop transmission siting authority.128 For the first time, FERC had authority
not only to regulate interstate transmission and wholesale transaction, but also to
approve the construction of physical transmission facilities.
Congress split the delegated siting authority between the Department of
Energy (DOE) and FERC.129 First, DOE must conduct a transmission congestion
study and, based on the conclusions of that study and input from potentially
affected states, designate “national interest electric transmission corridors”
(“NIETCs”).130 In deciding whether to designate a NIETC, the statute directs DOE
to consider the following factors:
(A) the economic vitality and development of the corridor, or the end markets
served by the corridor, may be constrained by lack of adequate or reasonably
priced electricity;
(B) (i) economic growth in the corridor, or the end markets served by the
corridor, may be jeopardized by reliance on limited sources of energy; and
(ii) a diversification of supply is warranted;
(C) the energy independence of the United States would be served by the
designation;
(D) the designation would be in the interest of national energy policy; and
131
(E) the designation would enhance national defense and homeland security.

Once DOE designates a corridor, FERC then has “backstop” authority to site
electricity transmission facilities in certain situations: (1) when the relevant state
lacks authority to approve the transmission facility or consider interstate benefits in
121. Id. at 831.
122. Id. at 836.
123. Id. at 842. These characteristics are independence from market participants, appropriate scope
and regional configuration, operational authority over transmission facilities, and exclusive authority
over short-term grid reliability. Id.
124. Id. at 811.
125. See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Sep. 20, 2013).
126. See Dworkin, supra note 1, at 538-39.
127. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in various U.S.C. titles).
Congress also directed FERC to establish incentive-based rates to encourage reliability and new
investment in transmission. 16 U.S.C. § 824s (2006).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 824p.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 824p(a).
131. Id. § 824p(a)(4).
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making a siting decision; (2) if the transmission utility cannot obtain siting
approval because it does not serve customers in the relevant state; or (3) the state
agency has authority to approve the siting but either withholds approval for more
than one year or imposes conditions on approval that make the project
economically unfeasible.132
Congress thus allowed FERC to approve the siting of new transmission
facilities, but FERC’s authority is conditioned first on DOE designation and then
on state agency inaction, inability to act, or unreasonable action.133 If the
conditions in the statute are satisfied, FERC may issue a construction permit for the
transmission facility.134 In addition to receiving siting approval, the holder of a
FERC-granted permit can exercise eminent domain in federal or state court to
acquire property from hold-outs.135
Pursuant to the newly added Section 216 of the FPA, in 2007 DOE released
the results of its first National Electric Transmission Congestion Study.136 Two
areas were designated Critical Congestion Areas: the Mid-Atlantic region, from
New York City to Northern Virginia; and Southern California (Southwest Area).137
DOE also found four Congestion Areas of Concern, one of which was New
132. Id. § 824p(b). The statute states that FERC may issue a siting permit in a NIETC if it finds that:
(1)(A) a State in which the transmission facilities are to be constructed or modified does
not have authority to—
(i) approve the siting of the facilities; or
(ii) consider the interstate benefits expected to be achieved by the proposed construction
or modification of transmission facilities in the State;
(B) the applicant for a permit is a transmitting utility under this Act but does not qualify
to apply for a permit or siting approval for the proposed project in a State because the
applicant does not serve end-use customers in the State; or
(C) a State commission or other entity that has authority to approve the siting of the
facilities has—
(i) withheld approval for more than 1 year after the filing of an application seeking
approval pursuant to applicable law or 1 year after the designation of the relevant national
interest electric transmission corridor, whichever is later; or
(ii) conditioned its approval in such a manner that the proposed construction or
modification will not significantly reduce transmission congestion in interstate commerce
or is not economically feasible.
Id.
133. Section 824p(b)(1) also provides five other conditions that must be met before FERC may issue
a construction permit for a transmission line:
(2) the facilities to be authorized by the permit will be used for the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce;
(3) the proposed construction or modification is consistent with the public interest;
(4) the proposed construction or modification will significantly reduce transmission
congestion in interstate commerce and protects or benefits consumers;
(5) the proposed construction or modification is consistent with sound national energy
policy and will enhance energy independence; and
(6) the proposed modification will maximize, to the extent reasonable and economical,
the transmission capabilities of existing towers or structures.
Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 824p(e)(1).
136. National Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992 (Dep’t of Energy, Oct.
5, 2007).
137. Id. at 56,995.
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England.138 Based on the critical congestion areas, DOE designated the MidAtlantic National Corridor and the Southwest Area National Corridor as NIETCs
for a duration of twelve years.139 Commenters on the draft designation voiced
numerous concerns and arguments against the NIETC designation: Section 216 of
the FPA violated the Fifth and Tenth Amendments; transmission companies
improperly influenced DOE; DOE should instead focus on conservation and energy
efficiency; DOE did not allow sufficient public input; the designated corridors
included culturally or environmentally sensitive lands; the corridors were drawn
too broadly; and DOE did not adequately consult with states in the corridors.140
In the following years states and conservation groups challenged both the
FERC and DOE aspects of the backstop siting authority conferred by EPAct 2005
in Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC141 and California Wilderness
Coalition v. Department of Energy.142 Both decisions further constrained DOE and
FERC’s already limited authority to site transmission facilities.
In Piedmont, the Fourth Circuit in 2009 narrowly construed FERC’s siting
authority in holding that FERC could not exercise its siting authority when a state
actually denies a transmission siting application.143 State utility commissions and
environmental advocacy organizations challenged FERC’s broad interpretation of
one of the conditions triggering its backstop siting authority, when a state agency
has “withheld approval for more than 1 year.”144 FERC interpreted “withheld” to
include a state’s denial of a siting application.145 The Fourth Circuit, despite
applying Chevron deference,146 held that FERC’s interpretation was contrary to the
plain meaning of “withheld” in Section 216 of the FPA.147 The court reasoned that
Congress intended to grant FERC only limited authority, and that FERC’s
interpretation would effectively preempt state authority if a state utility commission
denied a permit.148 Judge Traxler, dissenting from the majority’s interpretation of
FPA Section 216, noted the broader purpose of EPAct 2005 to expand the
transmission system to avoid blackouts and higher costs due to congestion.149
Judge Traxler argued that Congress could have added “for more than 1 year” to
“withheld” to allow a state utility commission to deny an application, change its
mind, and grant a permit within one year.150 And Congress could not have
intended to allow FERC siting authority when a state imposed project-killing
138. Id. The other three were the Phoenix-Tucson area, San Francisco Bay area, and the SeattlePortland area. Id.
139. Id. at 57,014, 57,021.
140. See id. at 56,997, 57,001-02, 57,005, 57,009.
141. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009).
142. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011).
143. Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 313.
144. Id. at 310-11.
145. Id. at 313. “Congress intended to act in a measured way and conferred authority on FERC only
when a state commission is unable to act on a permit application in a national interest corridor, fails to
act in a timely manner, or acts inappropriately by granting a permit with project-killing conditions.” Id.
at 315.
146. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
147. Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 313.
148. Id. at 314.
149. Id. at 321 (Traxler, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
150. Id. at 323.
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conditions but not when a state simply denied an application.151 Less than one
month after the Piedmont decision, Acting Chairman of FERC, Jon Wellinghoff,
asked the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources to grant FERC
increased transmission siting authority.152 So far, Congress has declined to do so.
Two years later, in 2011, a number of state public utility commissions and
environmental advocacy groups challenged the DOE aspect of the backstop siting
authority. In particular, the challenges focused on the way DOE conducted the
congestion study mandated by EPAct 2005 and its subsequent designation of the
two NIETCs.153 The Ninth Circuit in California Wilderness held that DOE acted
beyond the scope of its authority in EPAct 2005 because it failed to adequately
consult with affected states in conducting the congestion study.154 DOE argued
that it satisfied its obligation to consult with states through notice-and-comment
proceedings.155 The court rejected this argument and concluded, based on the
ordinary meaning of and case law defining “consult,” that DOE failed to consult
with the states.156 In particular, DOE did not circulate a draft of the congestion
study to states, did not affirmatively reach out to states, and did not provide states
with the modeling data it used in the study, and DOE’s failure to meaningfully
consult with the states was not harmless error.157
In 2011, DOE solicited comments on a FERC proposal for DOE to delegate its
congestion study and NIETC authority to FERC, which would have consolidated
federal backstop siting authority in one agency.158 DOE ultimately decided against
delegation, instead promising to make the congestion study and NIETC designation
process more efficient and transparent.159 DOE has conducted public workshops
and received comments in connection with its 2012 National Electric Transmission
Congestion Study, but it has not yet released the final study.160
151. Id. at 324.
152. Hearing on Legislation Regarding Electric Transmission Lines Before the S. Comm. on Energy
& Nat. Resources, 111th Cong. 2, 6 (2009) (statement of Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman of FERC).
153. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). See 16 U.S.C.
§ 824p(a)(1) (2006) (“[T]he Secretary of Energy . . . , in consultation with affected States, shall conduct
a study of electric transmission congestion.”).
154. Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1079.
155. Id. at 1086.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1087-90.
158. FERC Proposal for Delegation of DOE Authority, ENERGY.GOV (Sept. 9, 2011, 1:00 PM),
http://energy.gov/oe/articles/ferc-proposal-delegation-doe-authority.
159. DOE and FERC Joint Public Statement on Back Stop Siting, ENERGY.GOV (Oct. 11, 2011, 1:32
PM), http://energy.gov/articles/doe-and-ferc-joint-public-statement-back-stop-siting.
160. 2012 National Electric Transmission Congestion Study, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/
oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/transmission-planning/2012-national
(last visited Oct. 10, 2013). The New England States Committee on Electricity (NESCOE), composed
of appointees of each of the six state’s Governors, filed a comment with DOE about the 2012
Congestion Study. Letter from New England States Committee on Electricity to David Meyer, Dep’t of
Energy (Jan. 31, 2012), http://nescoe.com/uploads/2012CongestStudyCommentsJan2012.pdf. NESCOE
reminded DOE that New England was no longer a “Congestion Area of Concern” in DOE’s 2009
Congestion Study and stated that congestion in New England “is today virtually nonexistent.” Id.
NESCOE then described various transmission projects in New England that have been sited or were in
the process of being sited to show that congestion would not be a problem in the future. Id. But see
discussion infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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The recent history of the electricity industry is one of vertically-integrated,
state-regulated public utilities suddenly confronted with competition by non-utility
generators. To promote competition in generation, Congress, by enacting PURPA
and EPAct 1992, forced public utilities to open up their transmission facilities for
use by competitors, and FERC has implemented a policy of open access to
transmission services through Orders 888 and 2000. In addition, in recent decades
merchant transmission developers—non-utility transmission owners who recover
transmission project costs by negotiating rates, not cost-based rates161—and
independent transmission developers have introduced competition into the
transmission-side of the electricity industry by building transmission projects not
owned by incumbent public utilities.162
Despite these policy and market developments, the current transmission
infrastructure still requires significant upgrade to reliably accommodate both a
robust wholesale electricity market and renewable energy sources.163 Siting new
transmission lines has traditionally been the domain of the states,164 and FERC’s
backstop siting authority in Section 216 of the FPA, especially as limited by
Piedmont and California Wilderness, does little to change the status quo. The next
part of this Comment considers how states have exercised their siting authority.
II. THE STATE ROLE IN REGULATING ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION
State regulation of electricity transmission siting varies in several respects:
regulatory structure; the entities that may build transmission facilities; the standards
for granting a certificate to build a new transmission facility; and whether state
regulators may coordinate with other states or consider out-of-state benefits in
approving or denying a transmission project. Some regions of the country have
undergone at least partial deregulation of the electricity industry, where
transmission and distribution utilities are required to divest their generation assets
and some sort of independent operator (e.g., an ISO) operates the transmission grid
in the region.165
A majority of states place the authority to approve a transmission project in
one state agency, usually a public utility commission (PUC).166 Some states have
created siting boards composed of representatives from various state agencies.167
The rest of the states do not consolidate siting authority in one state agency, instead
requiring developers to seek approval from multiple agencies.168

161. Order 1000, supra note 11, at 49863.
162. See Heidi Werntz, Let’s Make A Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission, 28 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 424 (2011) (“Merchant transmission providers are distinguished from other
transmission providers by the fact that they do not serve captive retail customers and assume all market
risk of a transmission project.”).
163. See Rossi, supra note 70, at 1024, 1029-30.
164. See id. at 1019.
165. See Pierce, supra note 88, at 469-70.
166. BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 16, 18.
167. Id. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69H (West 2003 & Supp. 2012).
168. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 16, 18. See e.g., EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATE
GENERATION & TRANSMISSION SITING DIRECTORY 31, 43, 103 (2012) (Georgia, Indiana, and
Oklahoma).
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States also differ on whether they issue certificates to build transmission
projects to non-public utilities, and, if so, whether a merchant transmission
developer may apply to become a public utility. For instance, Arkansas Public
Service Commission (PSC) lacked authority to recognize a merchant transmission
developer, Plains and Eastern Clean Line LLC, as a public utility so that it could
build two transmission lines to bring renewable wind energy from Oklahoma and
through Arkansas to other states in the southern part of the United States.169
Although the Arkansas PSC expressed its support for merchant transmission
development generally, it only had jurisdiction to grant a public utility the
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity required to build a transmission
line.170 The Arkansas PSC concluded that Clean Line was not a public utility
within the meaning of the relevant Arkansas statute because it did not own or
operate transmission in the state or have any contracts to deliver power in
Arkansas.171 Oklahoma, on the other hand, granted Clean Line public utility status
for a transmission project that would not serve the public in Oklahoma but would
transfer windpower from Oklahoma to Tennessee.172 This example of conflicting
regulations in neighboring states illustrates the challenge confronting merchant or
independent transmission developers that wish to build an interstate transmission
line.
In many states, regulatory approval of a new transmission line is conditioned
on demonstrated public need.173 Regulatory approval in the form of a certificate of
public need is frequently also a prerequisite for exercising eminent domain
authority.174 “Need” typically has a narrow meaning restricted to the necessity of
the new transmission facility within the state only.175 One criticism of such a
restricted meaning of “need” in the approval of transmission projects is that state
regulators do not consider potential benefits or costs to an entire region, even
though the development of wholesale energy markets makes it likely that new
transmission facilities will affect several states.176
Finally, states differ on whether their statutes allow state agencies to
coordinate with other states for the purpose of transmission planning and siting.177
A report by the National Council on Energy Policy from 2008 found that twelve
169. In the Matter of the Application of Plains and Eastern Clean Line LLC for a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity to Construct, Own and Operate as an Electric Transmission Public
Utility in the State of Arkansas, Docket No. 10-041-U (Ark. P.S.C., Jan. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Clean
Line Arkansas Application], available at http://www.apscservices.info/pdf/10/10-041-u_41_1.pdf.
170. Id. at 9-11. See ARK CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-201(a), 23-3-205 (2012).
171. Clean Line Arkansas Application, supra note 169, at 10-11.
172. In re Application of Plains and Eastern Clean Line LLC, to Conduct Business as an Electric
Utility in the Sate of Oklahoma, PUD 201000075 (OCC Oct. 28, 2011 (Order No. 590530)), available at
http://imaging.occeweb.com/ap/orders/0300D92C.pdf.
173. See Rossi, supra note 70, at 1019.
174. See id.; Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013) (analyzing
the state statutes and the issue whether merchant transmission developers can exercise eminent domain
authority).
175. See Rossi, supra note 70, at 1019; Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 721-24.
176. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 721-24.
177. See JULIA FRIEDMAN & MILES KEOGH, NAT'L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, COORDINATING
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION SITING: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEBATE 7-10 (2008)
(compiling state statutes).
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states have statutes that are silent on the issue of interstate coordination, whereas
twenty-three states had statutes encouraging some form of interstate coordination
for electricity regulation generally.178 Some states also encourage or require state
agencies to participate in RTOs.179
The rest of this Part explores how Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire
exercise their authority over transmission siting. Maine is a potential net wind
energy producer, and a transmission line delivering wind power generated in Maine
to load centers would likely travel through New Hampshire and Massachusetts.
A. Maine
In Maine, transmission developers must apply to the Maine Public Utilities
Commission (MPUC) for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN)
to build a transmission line.180 A CPCN is also necessary before MPUC may grant
a transmission and distribution utility181 eminent domain authority for transmission
construction.182 A Maine statute imposes an extendable six-month time limit on
the MPUC to make a determination whether to issue a CPCN.183
The MPUC must find that a “public need” for the transmission line exists
before granting a CPCN.184 Maine’s definition of “public need” is somewhat
broader than many other states, in that it allows the MPUC to consider a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors in determining public need.
In determining public need, the commission shall, at a minimum, take into
account economics, reliability, public health and safety, scenic, historic and
recreational values, state renewable energy generation goals, the proximity of the
proposed transmission line to inhabited dwellings and alternatives to construction
of the transmission line, including energy conservation, distributed generation or
load management.185
By including “state renewable energy generation goals” in its statute, Maine
allows the MPUC to consider the state’s explicit public policy of promoting
renewable energy generation, which tends to require more transmission facilities
than traditional fossil-fuel or hydroelectric generation.186 In addition, MPUC uses
178. Id. at 7-8.
179. Id. at 9-10.
180. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3132 (2010 & Supp. 2012).
181. Id. § 102(20-B).(A “transmission and distribution utility” is “a person, its lessees, trustees or
receivers or trustees appointed by a court, owning, controlling, operating or managing a transmission
and distribution plant for compensation within the State.”).
182. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3136(4) (2010) (“The commission may not approve a location to be taken by
eminent domain for the construction, rebuilding or relocation of a transmission line that requires a
certificate of public convenience and necessity under section 3132, unless the commission has issued a
certificate of public convenience and necessity for that transmission line.”).
183. Id. § 3132(2) (2010 & Supp. 2012).
184. Id. § 3132(6).
185. Id.
186. See id. § 3210(1) (“In order to ensure an adequate and reliable supply of electricity for Maine
residents and to encourage the use of renewable, efficient and indigenous resources, it is the policy of
this State to encourage the generation of electricity from renewable and efficient sources and to
diversify electricity production on which residents of this State rely in a manner consistent with this
section.”); id. § 3210(3-A) (listing renewable energy generation goals); id. § 3402 (2010) (“The
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language almost identical to the statute in its rule implementing Section 3132.187
Despite Maine’s relatively broad statutory definition of “public need” for
CPCN approval, it is limited in several ways that discourage transmission
development. Any explicit consideration of regional transmission needs, including
meeting other states’ renewable energy goals,188 is absent from the list in Section
3132(6). If, for instance, Maine could produce enough renewable energy to exceed
its own goals, but neighboring states were failing to meet their own renewable
goals for lack of renewable generation resources like wind or tidal power, Section
3132(6) does not explicitly allow MPUC to consider the demand for renewable
energy in other states.189 Additionally, eminent domain authority might be limited
to transmission lines with a demonstrable benefit to Maine citizens.190
Furthermore, MPUC must deny a CPCN application upon finding “that the
transmission line is reasonably likely to adversely affect any transmission and
distribution utility or its customers.”191 The Maine Legislature added this clause in
2009.192 This clause, by protecting not only ratepayers but also incumbent utilities,
adds an additional barrier for independent developers seeking to invest in new
transmission lines.193
Legislature finds that it is in the public interest to explore opportunities for and encourage the
development, where appropriate, of wind energy production in the State . . . .”).
187. See 65-470 C.M.R. ch. 330, § 9-B (2012). For an example of MPUC applying the CPCN
factors, see Re Cent. Me. Power Co., Request for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for
the Maine Power Reliability Program Consisting of the Construction of Approximately 350 Miles of
345 kV and 115 kV Transmission Lines (“MPRP”), No. 2008-255, Order, pp. 20-21 (Me. P.U.C. June
10, 2010).
188. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25-A, § 11F (West 2010) (renewable energy portfolio
standard).
189. It may, however, consider the economic benefit to Maine in transmitting excess renewable
generation capacity to other states under the “economics” factor in Section 3132(6).
190. See Steven J. Eagle, Securing A Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2005) (“While the need for siting transmission lines is regional
and national, courts generally act on the proposition that a State cannot use its power of eminent domain
for the benefit of the citizens of another State. Courts find this limitation within the source of the
legislative power; the sovereign is obligated to protect and promote the health, safety, morals, and
welfare of citizens of the individual state.”).
191. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3132(6) (2010 & Supp. 2012).
192. P.L. 2009, ch. 123, § 5.
193. The outcome of an Arkansas PSC/Clean Line scenario in Maine is not clear—whether a
merchant transmission developer that did not own any transmission or generation assets in Maine could
obtain a CPCN to build a transmission line through the state. Section 3132 states that “a person may not
construct any transmission line” without a CPCN, 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3132 (2010 & Supp. 2012), and also
that a “person” shall file a petition with MPUC to build a transmission line of more than 69 kV, id. §
3132(2). The use of “person” is clearly broader than public utility, and presumably would allow a
merchant transmission developer to petition the MPUC for a CPCN. On the other hand, statute grants
MPUC jurisdiction over “[a]ll public utilities and certain other entities as specified in [Title 35-A]” and
directs it to “regulate public utilities in accordance with [Title 35-A].” Id. § 103(2)(A)-(B). These
provisions limit MPUC jurisdiction to public utilities and “certain other entities,” and it is unclear
whether “certain other entities” includes the “persons” in Section 3132 defining the requirement for a
CPCN to build transmission. Furthermore, even if a merchant transmission developer could obtain a
CPCN in Maine, it may not be able to exercise eminent domain authority because a Maine statute limits
such authority to a “transmission and distribution utility” to exercise eminent domain with the approval
of MPUC. Id. § 3136(1) (2010). A “transmission and distribution utility” is “a person . . . owning,
controlling, operating or managing a transmission and distribution plant for compensation within the
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B. Massachusetts
Massachusetts vests transmission siting authority in the Massachusetts Energy
Facilities Siting Board (“Siting Board”) composed of representatives from several
states agencies, the utilities commission, and the public.194 The Siting Board
exercises its authority so as “to provide a reliable energy supply for the
commonwealth with a minimum impact on the environment at the lowest possible
cost.”195 The statute creating the Siting Board thus clearly articulates values that
should guide siting decisions: reliability, environmental protection, and efficiency.
The statute draws on the same values when it directs the Siting Board to review
proposed transmission projects based on the “need for, cost of, and environmental
impacts of transmission lines.”196 Developers must seek approval from the Siting
Board to build a transmission project, and no other state agency may issue a permit
for the project before the Siting Board gives its approval.197 The Siting Board must
conduct a public hearing and make a decision on the petition within one year.198
In addition, the Siting Board has robust backstop authority to grant a
Certificate of Environmental Impact and Public Interest (CEIPI) for a transmission
developer if another state or local agency delays approval, imposes conditions that
make the project unfeasible, raises a “nonregulatory issue” like aesthetic impact or
recreation, makes a decision inconsistent with another agency, or denies
approval.199 The Siting Board’s backstop authority over other state and local
agencies is therefore considerably broader than FERC’s backstop authority over
states pursuant to Section 216 of the FPA. The Siting Board must decide on the
petition for a CEIPI “[a]s expeditiously as possible but in no event later than six
months” after the petition is filed.200 The Siting’s Board CEIPI decision must be in
writing and include findings and opinions about (1) “the need for the facility to
meet the energy requirements of the applicant’s market area” based on agreements
with other utilities and “energy policies as adopted by the commonwealth”; (2) “the
compatibility of the facility with considerations of environmental protection, public
health and public safety”; (3) the project’s consistency with state and local laws;
and (4) “the public interest, convenience and necessity requiring construction and
operation of the facility.”201 Like many states, Massachusetts bases its siting
decision on need, but broadens the definition somewhat to include need based on
energy policies, including the Massachusetts Renewable Portfolio Standard

State.” Id. § 102(20-B) (2010 & Supp. 2012). A merchant transmission developer with no transmission
or distribution assets in Maine may not to fit this definition.
194. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69H (West 2003 & Supp. 2013).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. § 69J (“No applicant shall commence construction of a facility at a site unless a petition for
approval of construction of that facility has been approved by the board and, in the case of an electric or
gas company which is required to file a long-range forecast pursuant to section sixty-nine I, that facility
is consistent with the most recently approved long-range forecast for that company.”).
198. Id.
199. Id. § 69K.
200. Id. § 69O.
201. Id.
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requirements.202 The Siting Board could find that a transmission facility was
necessary to satisfy the Commonwealth’s renewable energy goals by, for instance,
connecting to wind generators off Cape Cod or in the Berkshires, or in another state
like Maine.203 Yet the Massachusetts statute is silent on the issues of interstate
coordination204 and consideration of regional benefits in approving a transmission
siting project.
Massachusetts’ statute also allows any person, not just public utilities, to
petition the Siting Board for approval of a transmission project.205 However, only
an “electric, gas or oil company” may petition the Siting Board to issue a CEIPI in
the event of an adverse state or local agency decision.206 Under Section 69G, an
“electric company”, for the purposes of Siting Board jurisdiction, includes a
corporation organized under the laws of Massachusetts or another state to
“generate, transmit, distribute or sell electricity for ultimate use by fifty or more
persons,” as well as the general definition of “electric company” for Chapter 164 of
the Massachusetts General Laws.207 The general definition, in Section 1, means “a
corporation organized under the laws of the commonwealth . . . for selling,
transmitting, distributing, transmitting and selling, or distributing and selling,
electricity within the commonwealth,” but does not include “a corporation only
transmitting and selling, or only transmitting, electricity” unless that corporation is
affiliated with a Massachusetts distribution company.208
The general definition of “electric company” in Section 1 therefore appears to
exclude a merchant or independent transmission developer, unless the developer is
affiliated with a local distribution company. The general definition also requires
that the transmission company transmit electricity within Massachusetts, and it is
not clear on the face of the statute whether a transmission line that merely passes
through Massachusetts would meet this definition.209 However, the more specific
definition of “electric company” for Siting Board jurisdiction in Section 69G does
seem to encompass a merchant transmission developer, so long as the company
serves at least fifty persons, and the statute does not explicitly require those persons
to be citizens of Massachusetts. Therefore, based on the more specific definition in
Section 69G, it seems as though an independent or merchant transmission
developer could petition the Siting Board for a CEIPI.

202. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25-A, § 11F (West 2010 & Supp. 2013) (creating renewable
portfolio standard).
203. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 858 N.E.2d 294,
301 n.9 (Mass. 2006) (noting that a change in the Siting Board’s statutory mandate broadened the
Board’s focus from need to reliability).
204. See FRIEDMAN & KEOGH, supra note 177, at 7.
205. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69G (West 2003 & Supp. 2013) (“‘Applicant’, a person
or persons who submits to the department or board . . . a petition to construct a facility . . . .”); id. § 69J
(“No applicant shall commence construction of a facility at a site unless a petition for approval of
construction of that facility has been approved by the board. . . . ”) (emphasis added).
206. Id. § 69K.
207. Id. § 69G.
208. Id. § 1.
209. Cf. Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787,
806 (Mass. 2010) (concluding that petitioners had waived argument that developer, organized as an
LLC, was not a “corporation” within the meaning of Section 1).
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C. New Hampshire
New Hampshire, like Massachusetts, has created a specific body for siting
transmission projects—the Site Evaluation Committee, whose members are
representatives from various state agencies.210 Unlike the Massachusetts Energy
Facilities Siting Board, however, the Site Evaluation Committee has no authority to
override the decisions of other state agencies.211 Instead, the Site Evaluation
Committee receives applications for certificates to construct energy facilities,
conducts a preliminary review of the completeness of the application within 60
days, forwards applications to relevant state agencies, and conducts public hearings
in affected counties.212 Within eight months each state agency reports to the Site
Evaluation Committee its final decision on the part of the application within its
jurisdiction, and then the Site Evaluation Committee, within nine months of
accepting the application, denies or approves the project.213
Unlike the
Massachusetts Siting Board with its backstop authority, the New Hampshire Siting
Evaluation Committee lacks the authority to grant a certificate if another state
agency denies approval.214
If all state agencies do grant approval on a project, then the Site Evaluation
Committee may issue a certificate “after having considered available alternatives
and fully reviewed the environmental impact of the site or route” if it finds that the
site and facility will be built by an applicant with technical and financial ability to
complete the project, “[w]ill not unduly interfere with the orderly development of
the region,” and “[w]ill not have an unreasonable adverse effect on aesthetics,
historic sites, air and water quality, the natural environment, and public health and
safety.”215 There is no requirement that the Site Evaluation Committee base its
determination on a finding of “need,” although the New Hampshire legislature in
creating the Site Evaluation Committee found that it was in the public interest that
the state have “an adequate and reliable supply of energy in conformance with
sound environmental principles.”216 Finally, unlike either Maine or Massachusetts,
the New Hampshire legislature explicitly stated that the Site Evaluation Committee
“may consult with interested regional agencies and agencies of border states in the
consideration of certificates.”217
One of the New Hampshire state agencies other than the Site Evaluation
Committee with jurisdiction over transmission line siting is the New Hampshire
Public Utilities Commission (NHPUC).218 The relevant statute provides that “[n]o
person or business entity . . . shall . . . begin the construction of a plant, line, main,
or other apparatus or appliance to be used therein . . . without first having obtained
210. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §162-H:3 (2002 & Supp. 2012).
211. Id. § 162-H:16.
212. Id. § 162-H:7.
213. Id. (Supp. 2012).
214. Id. § 162-H:16(I) (2002 & Supp. 2012) (“[T]he committee shall not issue any certificate under
this chapter if any of the other state agencies denies authorization for the proposed activity over which it
has jurisdiction.”).
215. Id. § 162-H:16(IV).
216. Id. § 162-H:1.
217. Id. § 162-H:16(III).
218. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374:22 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
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the permission and approval of the [NHPUC].”219 The NHPUC jurisdiction to
approve a transmission line is thus not limited to public utilities. The NHPUC is
also required to participate in:
[A]ctivities of the New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners, the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, and the New England
States Committee on Electricity, or other similar organizations, and work with the
New England Independent System Operator . . . to advance the interests of New
Hampshire with respect to wholesale electric issues, including policy goals
relating to fuel diversity, renewable energy, and energy efficiency, and to assure
nondiscriminatory open access to a safe, adequate, and reliable transmission
220
system at just and reasonable prices.

NHPUC is thus explicitly mandated to participate in regional transmission
planning activities, although (understandably) the intention behind this provision
seems more to advocate for New Hampshire’s own interests in the region rather
than to encourage cooperation for the good of the entire region.
Finally, the eminent domain authority that the NHPUC may confer has two
limitations. The first is that only a “public utility” may petition the NHPUC to
exercise eminent domain in building a transmission line.221 A “public utility” is
defined broadly as “every corporation, company, association, joint stock
association, partnership and person . . . owning, operating or managing any plant or
equipment or any part of the same . . . in the generation, transmission or sale of
electricity ultimately sold to the public.”222 This definition seems to allow
independent or merchant transmission developers to acquire eminent domain
authority. A second, more interesting limitation is that a public utility may not
exercise eminent domain for a transmission project unless that project has been
approved for regional cost allocation by ISO-NE.223 This provision was added in
2012224 as a result of the proposed Northern Pass merchant transmission line.225
States have historically had physical siting authority for electricity
infrastructure projects like transmission and, accordingly, have established
regulatory regimes to approve projects planned and proposed by traditional
vertically-integrated public utilities.226 The requirement to demonstrate need
reflects the concern in the traditional model that a monopoly utility might overbuild
transmission facilities and pass the costs on to its captive customers in the state.227
Nor do statutes passed decades ago contemplate the possibility of non-utility
transmission developers, and states (inadvertently or not) have insulated incumbent
utilities from regional competition by failing to allow state PUCs and siting
agencies the authority to coordinate regionally and consider regional costs and
benefits. Limitations in state statutes and, perhaps more important, inherent lack of
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 374-F:8 (2009).
Id. § 371:1 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
Id. § 362:2 (2009).
Id. § 371:1 (Supp. 2012).
See H.B. 648, 162nd Gen. Ct. (N.H. 2012).
See infra Part III.
See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 706-07.
See id.
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incentive for states to evaluate projects from a regional or national perspective have
contributed to the inability to approve and site new transmission projects. Some
states, as discussed above, have tried to move beyond these limitations by allowing,
for instance, public utility commissions and siting agencies to consider public
policy goals, like renewable energy requirements, in addition to reliability and
efficiency.
Nonetheless, the current federalism structure for transmission
regulation presents serious barriers to a well-integrated grid capable of supporting
renewable energy generation and increasing system reliability. The next Part
explores the problems posed by federalism, before moving to possible solutions in
Part IV.
III. FEDERALISM ISSUES IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION
There are two primary federalism issues related to electricity transmission.
The first issue involves transmission planning and cost allocation—what
transmission facilities should be built and who will pay for them.228 Even after
planning and cost allocation decisions are made, however, the second issue of
siting authority remains—who ought to approve where transmission projects get
built.229 FERC has asserted more authority over planning and cost allocation
through its ratemaking authority under FPA Sections 205 and 206, but, as
discussed above, states have almost exclusive jurisdiction over siting decisions.
Before considering potential solutions to the problems confronting
transmission siting, this Part further defines the federalism challenges that create
these problems. Examples of delayed or denied transmission projects illustrate the
problems inherent in the current federalism model for transmission regulation.
FERC recently exercised its authority to exert more control over regional
transmission planning and cost-allocation by issuing Order 1000.230 Order 1000
strikes a new federalism balance and, though it concerns planning and costallocation, may suggest a way to shift the federalism model for transmission siting.
A. Defining the Issues
As discussed above in Parts I and II, both the federal and state governments
share jurisdiction over the electricity industry. To the extent that those jurisdictions
overlap, regulation of the electricity industry presents a “regulatory commons”
problem as conceptualized by Professor Buzbee.231 A tragedy of the regulatory
commons occurs when multiple regulators have overlapping jurisdiction over a
problem and this overlap creates disincentives for regulators to fix the problem
because they can deflect blame but will not be able to claim exclusive credit for a
solution.232 These overlaps can create a jurisdictional mismatch when the primary
government regulator’s jurisdiction is much broader or narrower than the problem

228. See id. at 761-63.
229. See id.
230. See Order 1000, supra note 11.
231. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 22 (2003).
232. Id.
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that needs to be addressed.233 In the case of transmission siting, there is a clear
jurisdictional mismatch between state agencies and transmission siting: a state
regulator’s jurisdiction is generally smaller than the regional transmission
problem.234 In the case of interstate transmission, neighboring states have
overlapping jurisdiction over one project. There can even be regulatory overlap
within a state if multiple state agencies must approve a transmission project. And,
finally, even federal backstop authority is split between DOE and FERC.
Moreover and somewhat paradoxically, Professor Wiseman notes that
renewable energy resources exhibit regulatory “anticommons” features.235
Transmission corridors, like parcels for wind or solar development, must overcome
numerous exclusion rights held by both private property owners and also agencies
at multiple levels of governments with the power to deny the project.236 The
holders of the exclusion rights have widely divergent interests, and this divergence
impedes efforts to forge approval and agreement among all the rights holders.237
More concretely, federalism issues arise in the context of transmission siting
because state interests do not match regional or national interests. Although large
transmission projects tend to have regional or even national benefits, states
generally consider only in-state benefits to decide whether to site those projects.238
Even if a state agency or utility commission has authority to consider regional
benefits, it will feel pressures from local interests more acutely than a regional or
federal entity would.239
There are numerous examples of local and state-level opposition delaying
projects for years (if not forever), like the Cape Wind project off the coast of
Massachusetts.240 A more recent local example is the opposition to the proposed
Northern Pass merchant transmission line in New Hampshire.241 The proposed line
would carry hydroelectric power through New Hampshire, including its scenic
White Mountains region, and ultimately connect to New England’s power grid.242
The project as currently proposed has provoked skepticism and in some cases
opposition among environmental groups,243 cities and towns,244 and New
233. Id. at 23-25.
234. See Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
477, 508 (2011).
235. See id. at 499 (Wiseman refers to renewable energy “parcels” in the context of renewable
energy generation, but her analysis also applies to transmission corridors.).
236. See id. at 499-500.
237. See id.
238. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy, and Market Entry, 15 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 178 (2005).
239. See id.
240. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 858 N.E.2d 294
(Mass. 2006).
241. See Project Overview, NORTHERN PASS, http://www.northernpass.us/project-overview.htm (last
visited Sept. 7, 2013).
242. See id.
243. See, e.g., Northern Pass, CONSERVATION L. FOUND., http://www.clf.org/northern-pass/ (last
visited Sept. 7, 2013).
244. See, e.g., Annmarie Timmons, Concord Planning Board to Northern Pass: Bury the Lines,
CONCORD MONITOR (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.concordmonitor.com/community/town-by-town/
concord/5548794-95/concord-planning-board-to-northern-pass-bury-the-lines.
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Hampshire citizens in general.245 Regardless of these projects’ merit or lack
thereof, these struggles highlight the discrepancy between localized, intense
interests to restrict transmission development and the regional and national need for
a stronger electric grid.
B. Order 1000: A Balanced Solution for Planning
Over the past decade, Congress and FERC have taken faltering steps toward
increased federal and regional authority over electricity transmission planning.
Building on Orders 888246 and 2000,247 FERC issued Order 890 in 2007 to remedy
undue discrimination in transmission planning and access to transmission
services.248 Citing “critical need for new transmission infrastructure” and noting
that “vertically-integrated utilities do not have an incentive to expand the grid to
accommodate new entries,” FERC determined that the transmission planning
process required changes.249 FERC required public utility transmission providers,
regardless of RTO/ISO membership, to follow certain planning principles and
participate in a coordinated planning process.250 FERC also expected non-utility
transmission providers to participate in these planning processes.251
Less than five years after issuing Order 890, FERC issued Order 1000 after
concluding that additional changes were necessary to facilitate open transmission
planning and cost-allocation, and to prevent discrimination by public utility
transmission providers.252 In issuing Order 1000, FERC further tipped the
allocation of power away from states and toward RTOs for transmission planning
and cost-allocation in order to confront the critical need for transmission
development.253
In general, FERC intended the reforms in Order 1000 “to work together to
ensure an opportunity for more transmission projects to be considered in the
transmission planning process on an equitable basis and increase the likelihood that
transmission facilities in the transmission plan will move forward to
construction.”254 In particular, the reforms in Order 1000 require transmission
providers to plan ahead for new transmission projects by participating in a regional
transmission planning process.255 The requirement in Order 1000 that utilities
engage in regional planning goes a step beyond the non-mandatory encouragement
of Orders 890 and 2000. Order 1000 also requires transmission providers to
245. See, e.g., Beth Daley, They’re Finding the Power to Just Say No: Many in North Country Unite
Against Hydroelectric Project, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2012, at A1.
246. See Order 888, supra note 97.
247. See Order 2000, supra note 114.
248. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266,
12,271 (Mar. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Order 890].
249. Id. at 12,275.
250. Id. at 12,279. These planning principles are “[c]oordination, openness, transparency,
information exchange, comparability, dispute resolution, regional participation, and congestion studies.”
Id. at 12,319.
251. Id. at 12,321.
252. See Order 1000, supra note 11, at 49,845.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 49,851.
255. Id. at 49,867.
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develop methods for spreading costs regionally and inter-regionally for new
transmission256 and to allow non-incumbent transmission developers257 to bid on
constructing and operating those new projects.258 Furthermore, in addition to the
traditional reliability and economic factors considered to determine if new
transmission facilities are needed, FERC adopted a requirement that local and
regional transmission planning processes also consider “public policy
requirements” established by state or federal laws or regulations, such as state
renewable portfolio standard requirements.259
The regional planning process required by Order 1000 expands the regional
cooperation and information sharing among transmission providers required by
Order 890 and further requires that planning proceed according to principles that
were merely voluntary under Order 890.260 It remains to be seen how transmission
providers will implement Order 1000, but by mandating regional planning
according to defined principles, Order 1000 should alleviate some of the
transmission scarcity and development delay problems caused by local opposition
and public utilities pursuing their own short-term self-interest.261
Another controversial reform in Order 1000 requires regional transmission

256. Id. at 49,920. FERC noted that “[w]ithin RTO or ISO regions, particularly those that encompass
several states, the allocation of transmission costs is often contentious and prone to litigation because it
is difficult to reach an allocation of costs that is perceived by all stakeholders as reflecting a fair
distribution of benefits.” Id. at 49,921.
257. Id. at 49,880 (“[A] ‘non-incumbent transmission developer’ refers to two categories of
transmission developer: (1) a transmission developer that does not have a retail distribution service
territory or footprint; and (2) a public utility transmission provider that proposes a transmission project
outside of its existing retail distribution service territory or footprint, where it is not the incumbent for
purposes of that project.”).
258. Id. at 49,880-81, 49,887.
259. Id. at 49,876. Order 1000 defines “public policy requirements” as “requirements established by
‘state or federal laws or regulations,’” which means “enacted statutes (i.e., passed by the legislature and
signed by the executive) and regulations promulgated by a relevant jurisdiction, whether within a state
or at the federal level.” Id. at 49,845.
260. Id. at 49,855-56. The planning principles are: “(1) [c]oordination; (2) openness; (3)
transparency; (4) information exchange; (5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution; and (7) economic
planning.” Id. at 49,855 n.61.
261. Order 1000 also contains cost allocation reforms. Although FERC declined to mandate specific
regional cost allocation methods, by requiring regional planning entities to adopt a FERC-approved
method to spread costs among beneficiaries for regional transmission projects, Order 1000 provides a
process to solve one of the thorniest issues preventing new transmission projects. See Id. at 49,929;
Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 762. FERC even stated that it has the legal authority to require
beneficiaries of regional transmission projects to pay involuntarily for costs, even if the beneficiary does
not “have a contractual or formalized customer relationship with the entity that is collecting the costs.”
Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,925. FERC also declined to adopt a nationwide method for cost
allocation for interregional transmission projects, instead requiring regional planning entities to develop
their own cost allocation principles. See id. at 49,931. Perhaps FERC did not want to include another
controversial requirement during an already controversial rulemaking, but a national standard for cost
allocation could provide consistency and certainty for independent transmission developers. On the
other hand, there are considerable differences between interregional needs, especially between
transmission systems on the West Coast and denser East Coast, and FERC may have concluded that a
national standard would not have been responsive to those needs. See id. at 49,933 (“Almost all
commenters urge the Commission not to adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to cost allocation and to
retain regional and interregional flexibility.”).
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planning entities to consider public policy requirements in federal and state laws
and regulations in addition to the traditional considerations of reliability and
economic efficiency.262 Perhaps the most important public policy requirements that
regional transmission planning entities must now consider are state renewable
portfolio standards. Although the order merely required “consideration” of such
requirements, the consideration of state renewable energy goals should address one
primary barrier to meeting those goals. By planning ahead for future transmission
demand based on expected new renewable electricity generation instead of
approving transmission projects on an ad hoc basis, RTOs and other regional
planning entities can reduce the time and cost required to get clean energy hooked
to the grid.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, Order 1000 eliminates the federal
right of first refusal for incumbent transmission developers for regional
transmission projects.263
FERC found this reform necessary to increase
competition in constructing and providing transmission services;264 in that sense, it
may signal the beginning of a competitive transmission market similar to the
reforms that led to a competitive wholesale electricity generation market in the
1990s.265 Before Order 1000 eliminated the federal right of first refusal, an
incumbent transmission developer—such as a public utility—had the opportunity
to construct a regional transmission project proposed by a non-incumbent
transmission developer, such as a merchant transmission company.266 Public
utilities could potentially use this power to stifle increased transmission access for
new forms of electricity generation built by QFs and independent power producers
or to bar new entrants to the transmission market.267 To address this concern,
Order 1000 requires regional planning processes to include standards for
submitting and proposing regional transmission projects, and further requires that
non-incumbent transmission developers have an opportunity to allocate costs of
projects regionally.268 In eliminating the federal right of first refusal, FERC had to
walk a fine line between encouraging competition through new, smaller, and
perhaps more innovative transmission developers, on the one hand, and alienating
the traditional transmission utilities that remain crucial to maintaining reliability
and expanding the nation’s transmission systems. Ultimately, FERC in Order 1000
tipped the balance of power away from incumbent public utilities and toward nonincumbent competitors.
Needless to say, public utilities and incumbent transmission providers in many
parts of the country opposed the elimination of a federal right of first refusal.269
262. See id. at 49,876.
263. Id. at 49,880. An incumbent transmission developer or provider is “entity that develops a
transmission project within its own retail distribution service territory or footprint.” Id.
264. See id. at 49,880-81.
265. Contra Pierce, Restructuring, supra note 88, at 461 (“Transmission and distribution remain
natural monopoly functions. No one except the folks at the Cato Institute support deregulation of
transmission or distribution.”).
266. Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,880.
267. See id. at 49,885.
268. Id. at 49,880.
269. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,184, 32,238-40 (May 17, 2012) [hereinafter Order 1000-A].

258

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

One major concern was that small, non-incumbent transmission developers who,
unlike existing public utilities, have no obligation to serve customers, could
propose a new transmission project, start construction, but then walk away if costs
or an economic shift caused the project to become unprofitable.270 There was also
opposition to FERC mandated regional transmission planning271 and consideration
of public policy requirements in evaluating the need for new transmission
facilities.272 In response to concerns, FERC issued two orders on rehearing and
clarification: Order 1000-A in May 2012273 and Order 1000-B in October 2012.274
Both orders affirmed the basic reforms in Order 1000, which set up a pending legal
challenge to Order 1000 in the D.C. Circuit.275
C. ISO-NE Order 1000 Compliance Filing
FERC required each regional planning entity or RTO to submit a compliance
filing describing how it expected to comply with Order 1000’s requirements.276
ISO-NE submitted its compliance filing on October 25, 2012.277 The comments and
protests to the filing illustrate the dynamics of the various interests in the
transmission system, including state regulators, public utilities, merchant and
independent transmission developers, generators, and environmental and
conservation groups. Although the compliance filing addressed planning and cost
allocation, the debate it generated is similar to debates over transmission siting.
For instance, to comply with Order 1000’s required process to identify
transmission needs driven by public policy requirements (e.g., RPS goals) and
evaluate potential solutions, ISO-NE proposed to have state regulators drive the
process.278 The New England States Committee on Electricity (NESCOE),
composed of regulators from the New England states, would have identified their
own transmission needs created by RPS policies, and then selected proposed
solutions for further evaluation, eventually choosing projects to place in the
regional transmission plan.279 This plan was supported by incumbent transmission
members of ISO-NE, but few other stakeholders.280 NESCOE, in its comments
suggesting changes to the compliance filing, argued that states must have the
central, “determinative” role in determining how to meet transmission needs
created by the state’s public policy.281 Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island separately commented to make a similar point.282 The American Wind
270. See id. at 32,239.
271. Id. at 32,203.
272. Id. at 32,232-33.
273. Order 1000-A, supra note 269.
274. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,890 (Oct. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Order 1000-B].
275. See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, Docket No. 12-1232 (D.C. Cir. May 25, 2012).
276. See ISO New England Inc., 143 FERC P 61,150 (2013).
277. Id. para. 5.
278. See id. paras. 79-84.
279. Id. para. 84.
280. Id. para. 85 n.154.
281. Id. paras. 93-94.
282. Id. para. 96. Note that the Department of Public Utilities of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission and the Connecticut Public Utilities
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Energy Association (AWEA) and, interestingly enough, the Maine PUC sounded
alarm at too much state control over the process and argued that ISO-NE must
make the final determination whether a proposed solution met an identified
transmission need.283 Ultimately, FERC agreed with AWEA and MPUC, and
required ISO-NE to submit a further compliance filing with a procedure not driven
solely by states.284
IV. POTENTIAL SITING SOLUTIONS: ALLOCATING POWER BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
AND STATE REGULATORS
Even if a regional approach, where the federal government sets limits within
which RTOs and state members may operate, strikes the right federalism balance
for transmission planning, an imbalance remains with respect to transmission
siting. In other words, once a transmission project is planned, the transmission
developer must then secure siting approval to build the transmission lines in a
specific area. Such siting approval authority is currently concentrated at the state
level, despite the recent attempt in EPAct 2005 to create and extend federal siting
authority.285
After President Obama took office in his first term, several Senators and
Representatives proposed legislation that would have granted FERC more authority
over transmission approval and siting.286 Although none of these proposals made it
out of committee in President Obama’s first term, there is always the possibility,
however remote, of similar proposals during his second term. In addition, the need
for increased transmission to meet national reliability goals and to facilitate
renewable energy development has led some commentators287 and regulators288 to
call for a stronger federal presence in transmission siting and approval decisions.
This Section surveys and evaluates various proposals for finding a new, more
efficient federalism balance for electricity transmission siting authority. First, in
the most extreme option, Congress could simply preempt state siting authority, as it
has for natural gas pipeline289 and LNG terminal290 siting. Second, instead of
completely preempting state authority, Congress could adopt a “process
preemption” regime, where initial siting authority remains with the state within
federally-articulated limits.291 Neither of these first two options may be politically
feasible, nor wise policy, however. Even if some level of federal preemption of
Regulatory Authority are intervenors and are identified collectively as the “Southern New England
States”. Id. app. A.
283. Id. paras. 97-98.
284. Id. para. 116.
285. 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006).
286. See Tara Benedetti, Recent Developments, Running Roughshod? Extending Federal Siting
Authority over Interstate Electric Transmission Lines, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 261-70 (2010)
(summarizing proposed legislation).
287. See Pierce, supra note 88, at 484-85; Vaheesan, supra note 12, at 87.
288. Transmission Infrastructure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources,
111th Cong. 10 (Mar. 12, 2009) (statement of Jon Wellinghoff, Acting Chairman, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission).
289. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2006).
290. Id. § 717b(e)(1).
291. See Ostrow, supra note 14, at 290; Klass & Wilson, supra note 14, at 1865.
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state siting authority is desirable, political obstacles may necessitate action that
does not require Congress. Therefore, third, FERC and other federal agencies292
may be able to improve regional cooperation in siting decisions. Finally, there are
steps states could take to improve siting interstate transmission lines. For instance,
the inclusion of a proposed transmission line in a regional plan approved by an
RTO or other regional entity could carry with it a presumption of public need and
convenience at the state-level siting decision.
A. Federal Solutions: Variations on Preemption
The first set of solutions involves varying levels of federal preemption of state
siting authority. Preemption has the advantage of placing jurisdiction with an
entity (i.e., FERC) in a position to consider regional and national benefits when
determining whether to approve and where to site a transmission project. These
approaches require action from Congress and would likely generate opposition
from states and perhaps incumbent utilities and thus may not be politically feasible.
In addition, the preemption options may not be good long-term policy, because
preemption risks alienating states and undermining local autonomy.
1. Complete Federal Preemption
Some commentators have called for complete federal preemption of state and
local siting authority by granting FERC full authority to approve the siting of
interstate transmission lines.293 Some have even suggested that FERC should have
jurisdiction over interstate and intrastate transmission lines above a given
voltage.294 Centralized siting authority with one federal regulator would greatly
streamline the siting approval process for transmission developers and allow
transmission projects to catch up to demand created by renewable energy
sources.295 Complete preemption would also take transmission siting out of the
hands of state and local regulators, who feel pressure from the parochial and
protectionist interests at the local level that stifle transmission projects.296
There are several examples of federal preemption in other areas of energy
regulation that could serve as models for transmission siting. In 1938, Congress
preempted state authority to regulate natural gas interstate transportation and
sales.297 Congress vested FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power Commission,
exclusive authority to regulate natural gas.298 Any company wishing to sell or
transport natural gas goes to FERC, and not a state or local regulatory body, to
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity.299 A more recent
292. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131 (2012).
293. See, e.g., Vaheesan, supra note 12, at 123-28 (arguing that Congress should completely preempt
state and local authority over transmission siting).
294. See id. at 124-25.
295. See id. at 126-27.
296. See id. at 125-26.
297. Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 831 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 717-717z (2006)); see HUNT, supra note 17, 395-402.
298. 15 U.S.C. § 717o.
299. Id. § 717f.
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preemption example appears in the EPAct of 2005, where, in addition to granting
FERC backstop siting authority over electricity transmission, Congress delegated to
FERC the authority to site liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, a power
previously exercised by state and local governments.300 The siting of LNG
terminals may be even more contentious and subject to pressure at the state and
local levels than electricity transmission siting, and Congress decided that
preemption was necessary to site LNG terminals.
Preemption of state authority over natural gas regulation and LNG terminal
siting provide a potential template for granting FERC exclusive electricity
transmission authority.301 Nonetheless, there are some significant differences
between transmission lines, on the one hand, and natural gas pipelines and LNG
terminals on the other. Natural gas pipelines are typically buried underground and
therefore do not raise the aesthetic concerns of tall electricity transmission towers
and lines. And, although LNG terminals may mar the view of the coastline,302 they
are confined to a localized area, whereas transmission lines stretch for miles.
Given the greater visibility and land impact of transmission lines and towers, states
and municipalities may resist federal preemption of electricity transmission siting
more strongly than preemption of natural gas pipeline of LNG terminal siting.
Setting aside the issue of whether natural gas regulation or LNG siting are apt
precedents for preemption of transmission siting authority, complete preemption
may not be desirable as a matter of policy.303 By consolidating siting authority in
one federal agency, FERC, the complete preemption approach may carry increased
risks of agency capture by incumbent public utilities. Instead of needing to capture
multiple agencies in various states, incumbent transmission developers would only
need to court regulators in one agency. In addition, incumbent transmission
utilities are far more likely than local opposition groups to have the necessary
funding and expertise to persuade a federal agency located in Washington, D.C.304
Of course, avoiding parochialism and local obstruction is a benefit of preemption,
but it does disempower local citizens and groups. Finally, federal preemption is
probably not politically feasible, at least at present.305 State governments and
300. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 311 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)). But see Joshua P. Fershee,
Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market Initiatives Are Insufficient to
Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 357 (2007) (“[W]hile it is
technically accurate that LNG siting is now solely a federal issue, the legislative history is replete with
contradictory statements concerning the scope of FERC’s exclusivity.”).
301. See Vaheesan, supra note 12, at 131.
302. See Abigail Curtis, Denver Company Tries to Sell Searsport on a Proposed Propane Terminal,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May 3, 2011, http://bangordailynews.com/2011/03/03/news/denver-companytries-to-sell-searsport-on-a-proposed-propane-terminal.
303. See Rossi, supra note 70, at 1039-48 (criticizing increased federal authority over transmission
siting and arguing that changes to transmission pricing and cost allocation are more important reforms);
Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Judge Cudahy and the Deference Tension in United States Energy Law,
29 YALE J. ON REG. 371, 382 (2012); Ari Peskoe, A Challenge for Federalism: Achieving National
Goals in the Electricity Industry, 18 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 209, 260-61 (2011) (arguing that
preemption is undesirable). Cf. Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217,
256-57 (2012) (discussing reasons against centralized authority for siting electricity generation
facilities).
304. See Peskoe, supra note 303, at 260.
305. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 14, at 1864-65.
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regulators likely will not give up control over transmission siting without a fight,
just as New England states resisted ceding authority over evaluating and approving
public policy transmission upgrades in their comments on the ISO-NE compliance
filing. On the other hand, given current state budget challenges, perhaps some state
legislatures would cede siting authority over transmission siting in order to cut
spending on state public utility commissions.
2. Partial, Process Preemption and Coordinated Federalism
An alternative to both complete federal preemption and the status quo for
transmission siting would be to partially shift the federalism balance for siting
toward the federal government and FERC. For instance, concluding that “neither
the federal government nor the state governments acting alone have the capacity to
implement federal siting policies,”306 Professor Ashira Pelman Ostrow has
proposed a “process preemption” approach for facilities siting that would combine
federal and local authority.307 Instead of the current balance of federal, state, and
local authority, however, she would reset the balance using as a model the cell
phone tower siting process defined by the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(TCA).308 The TCA allows state and local governments to retain decision-making
authority over cell phone tower siting, but it places limits on this authority by
prohibiting state or local governments from “unreasonably discriminat[ing] among
providers” and from blocking provision of wireless service309; by requiring state
and local governments to respond to requests to site cell phone towers “within a
reasonable period of time”310; by requiring a denial to “be in writing and supported
by substantial evidence contained in a written record”311; by preventing a denial
based on “environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that
such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations.”312 In addition, the TCA
provides for judicial review for “[a]ny person adversely affected by any final action
or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is
inconsistent” with the above limitations.313 The substantive limitations the TCA
places on state and local governments—the prohibitions on discrimination, blanket
bans of cell phone towers, and using environmental effects if the tower complies
with federal regulations—impose some national uniformity on cell phone tower
306. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 323 (“Federal siting regimes thus present a classic interjurisdictional
regulatory problem that cannot be effectively remedied by a regulatory regime that exclusively
empowers one level of government.”).
307. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 321. See also Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1435-36 (2012) (suggesting a local-officials-as-federal-agents model for allocation of
land use authority between federal and local government); Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow,
Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1049, 1091-97 (2009) (using TCA as a model to propose cooperative federalism approach for wind
energy generation siting).
308. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 317-20. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332
(2006).
309. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i).
310. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
311. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
312. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
313. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
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More important, as Professor Ostrow contends, the procedural
siting.314
protections in the TCA—the reasonable time for responses, the requirements of
written denials supported by substantial evidence, and judicial review—“increase
the transparency and consistency of the local siting process and facilitate judicial
review of individual siting decisions,” and “enhance the public’s perception of
fairness in the decision-making process, increasing public acceptance of the
ultimate result.”315
Professor Ostrow proposes applying a “process preemption” approach to
renewable energy generator siting.316 In particular, she focuses on siting wind
energy generation facilities.317 Although Professor Ostrow does not suggest
adopting a process preemption or cooperative federalism approach to electricity
transmission siting, such an application seems like a consistent extension of her
proposal, as Professors Klass and Wilson suggest.318 The parochialism,
protectionism, and NIMBYism problems that afflict wind turbine siting319 are
similar to those that impede transmission line siting. At the same time, the benefits
of expertise and regulatory experimentation at the state and local level are as
relevant for electricity transmission as they are for wind turbines.320
Under a process preemption regime for electricity transmission siting,
Congress could direct FERC to promulgate minimum procedural protections and
substantive limitations that all state and local governments must follow when
considering an application for a transmission siting project.321 This is similar to
FERC’s action in Order 890, in which FERC articulated principles utilities had to
follow in planning but left determinations about how to comply with those
principles to the utilities. The procedural and substantive parameters of a siting
coordinated federalism regime could apply only to transmission lines over a given
voltage, although that might have the adverse side-effect of encouraging states to
favor lower voltage transmission lines that may not be capable of meeting regional
transmission needs.322
Like the TCA, Congress could require siting decisions to be made by states
within a reasonable time, in writing, and based on substantial evidence, as well as

314. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 325. See also Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 307, at 1098.
315. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 326-27.
316. Id. at 335-36. Professor Ostrow also proposes a process preemption approach for siting of
radioactive waste disposal facilities. Id. at 337-340. See also Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 307, at 1091.
317. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 336 (“Process Preemption [for wind] would increase regulatory
uniformity, facilitating the development of nation-wide renewable energy infrastructure, without unduly
compromising the ability of local officials to respond to local conditions.”). See also Salkin & Ostrow,
supra note 307, at 1092 (“In particular, a federal wind siting policy should: (a) prohibit local
governments from banning wind energy facilities; (b) require local governments to make decisions on
wind siting within a reasonable period of time; and (c) require such decisions to be made in writing and
supported by substantial evidence.”).
318. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 14, at 1865-66.
319. See, e.g., SAVE OUR SEASHORE, http://saveourseashore.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
320. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 14, at 1866-67.
321. See Ostrow, supra note 14, at 320-22. Presumably, these procedural safeguards and substantive
limitations would also apply to RTOs and ISOs.
322. Cf. Wilkinson Memo, supra note 6 (explaining that low voltage lines connecting wind generation
to grid leads to curtailment).
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allow for federal judicial or FERC review.323 Congress could even go so far as to
require state public utilities commissions or other siting approval entities to
consider regional costs and benefits in their siting decisions. If Congress ever
adopts a federal RPS or renewable energy policy, it could require that regional,
state, and local officials consider that federal RPS or policy in making transmission
decisions. At the same time, such an approach would leave discretion at the state
and local level to account for regional differences and still allow for transparency
and public participation by non-market participant stakeholders.324
Despite the attractiveness of a coordinated federalism or process preemption
approach to transmission siting, there are some key problems. First, as Professor
Ostrow acknowledges, there have been some notable examples of failed
coordinated federalism regimes.325 One of these is the scheme established by the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985 to dispose of low-level
radioactive waste.326
Aside from the Supreme Court striking down as
commandeering the take-title provision of the Act,327 what remained of the lowlevel waste scheme was insufficient to encourage states to site nuclear waste
disposal facilities.328
Although the process preemption scheme in the TCA has been more successful
for siting cell-phone towers,329 there are some key differences between cell phone
tower siting and electricity transmission line siting. First, as the history of the
electric industry and its regulation shows, there are already thoroughly entrenched,
divergent interests in electricity transmission (and generation and distribution),
more so than the wireless telecommunications industry in 1986, when the TCA was
enacted. Second and similarly, any new transmission development becomes part of
an already established, delicate transmission network, whereas cell phone towers
are standalone structures, which makes siting them easier. Finally, a key part of the
problem in the electricity transmission siting status quo is the inability to account
for regional differences, and it is not clear why continuing to allow states even
federally-circumscribed control over the siting process would solve this part of the
problem.
Moreover, legal and practical issues arise when state agencies must implement
federal statutes. For instance, there are unsettled procedural and administrative law
questions about how a federal court would review a state agency implementing
federal siting standards according to federally-articulated procedural safeguards.330
323. See Ostrow, supra note 14, at 326; Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 307, at 1091-97.
324. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 14, at 1866.
325. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 316-17.
326. Low–Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub.L. 99–240, 99 Stat. 1842
(1986) (codified as amended at 42. U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (2006)); see Ostrow, supra note 14, at 31617.
327. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
328. See Ostrow, supra note 14, at 316-17.
329. See Ostrow, supra note 14, at 319.
330. See Josh Bender & Miles Farmer, Note, Curing the Blind Spot in Administrative Law: A Federal
Common Law Framework for State Agencies Implementing Cooperative Federalism Statutes, 122 YALE
L.J. 1280, 1283 (2013) (noting that questions include whether to apply Chevron deference, “whether
state or federal law should govern, which actions are reviewable, what standard of review to use, and
who bears the burden of proof in agency proceedings.”).
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Aside from these questions and even providing for federal judicial review, the
likely regional and state variation in implementing a federal siting standard could
undermine the standard’s benefits, allowing states to reassert parochial interests.
Finally, as Klass and Wilson acknowledge, Congress does not seem likely to pass
an act completely overhauling the electricity transmission siting regime in the near
future, especially in the face of staunch state opposition.331
3. Conditional Preemption: Increase FERC’s Backstop Siting Authority
An alternative proposal to facilitate transmission siting would simply be for
Congress to expand the backstop siting authority it delegated to FERC when it
added Section 216 to the FPA in enacting EPAct 2005.332 Congress could
essentially overrule the Piedmont Environmental Council333 decision by amending
Section 216334 to allow FERC to issue a construction permit for a transmission
project when a state has denied approval of the project, and not just when a state
has withheld approval.335 This proposed solution of course involves questions
similar to the process preemption solution about whether Congress is likely to enact
such a solution in the near future.
Alternatively, despite the Piedmont Environmental Council decision,336 FERC
could attempt to assert a broad interpretation of its backstop siting authority in
NIETCs outside the Fourth Circuit. Given that the Supreme Court denied cert337
for the Piedmont Environmental Council decision, however, FERC might face a
substantial risk of a similar outcome in other circuits. The Supreme Court could
have denied cert to wait for a split among the circuits to emerge if FERC forced the
issue. But of course FERC risked using its resources only to lose again in other
circuits and providing opponents of broad FERC authority further advantage. A
more immediate and difficult challenge for FERC is that DOE has designated only
two NIETCs in which FERC may exercise its backstop authority, one in Southern
California and another in the Mid-Atlantic.338 Piedmont Environmental Council
was limited to the Mid-Atlantic corridor, so FERC could only attempt to exercise
its broad interpretation of its backstop authority in the Ninth Circuit. And this
attempt, of course, would have little effect on New England.
Aside from obvious questions about the political or legal feasibility of this
solution, the low number of DOE-designated NIETCs leads to a more fundamental
problem with expanding FERC’s backstop siting authority: it may not be fast or
extensive enough to alleviate transmission problems. It takes years for DOE to
complete its congestion studies, and affected states fight even designation in an
331. Klass & Wilson, supra note 14, at 1867.
332. Energy Policy Act of 2005, P.L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 946, § 1221 (2005) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824p). See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
333. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. F.E.R.C., 558 F.3d 304 (4th. Cir. 2009).
334. 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006).
335. Id. at § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i).
336. Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 304.
337. Edison Elec. Inst. v. Piedmont Envtl. Council,130 S.Ct. 1138 (2010).
338. National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors, DOE, http://energy.gov/oe/services/
electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/transmission-planning/national-1 (last visited Apr.
21, 2013).
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NIETC, as California Wilderness illustrates. FERC’s backstop authority as
presently configured is thus limited by the NIETC limitation, and the inefficiency
of the NIETC process leads to the conclusion that increased FERC backstop siting
authority may not be enough to address transmission siting issues. Even if
Congress explicitly gave FERC authority to approve a transmission project when a
state denied the project, it would likely be years between the initial application to
the state and approval by FERC. In that time, a project’s investors would likely
move on to other projects.
B. State-based Solutions
Even if no federal or regional solution to the transmission problem is
forthcoming, there are reforms that states could implement to improve the
coordinated exercise of their siting authority. First, as discussed above in Part II,
states often adopt a narrow standard for siting transmission projects based on need
or efficiency.339 Ashley Brown and Professor Rossi even suggest eliminating the
need determination altogether because developers are unlikely to build
uneconomical transmission projects.340 A less extreme solution would be for state
legislatures to tailor the need determination to include regional benefits of
transmission projects and, less controversially, in-state benefits that might accrue
from economic development or exporting renewable energy.341
As an alternative or supplement to a broader definition of “public need” for
siting and permitting a transmission project, states could also adopt a rebuttable
presumption of need based on a project’s approval in the RTO or regional planning
process. The proposal would place the burden on project opponents to show that a
transmission project was not necessary, which may affect the outcome in at least
some siting decisions. This proposal thus would have benefits similar to vesting
RTOs or regional planning entities with siting authority, but it has the advantage of
not (legally, though it may politically) requiring states to act together. It would
also preserve state autonomy by allowing state siting agencies to act against the
presumption. Of course, the risk of such autonomy is to allow states and local
opponents to reassert parochial interests and delay or kill transmission projects.
In addition, state legislatures and courts could expand their eminent domain
statutes and doctrines to allow non-utility, independent, and merchant transmission
developers to petition for eminent domain authority.342 This would eliminate the
advantage public utilities hold over merchant and independent transmission
developers in negotiating rights-of-way for new projects and facilitate those
developers’ ability to improve the transmission system.343
Finally, state legislatures can direct their public utilities commissions or state
siting agencies to coordinate with neighboring states and participate in the regional
transmission planning process.344
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 44; Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 721-23.
Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 749-50.
See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 751.
See Klass, supra note 174, at 1151-52.
See id.
See FRIEDMAN & KEOGH, supra note 177, at 18-19.
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C. Recommendation: Vest Siting and Permitting Authority at the Regional Level
The federal preemption and state-based solutions still face limitations, despite
their probable benefits. Granting FERC some form of preemptive power over
siting might undermine public participation in siting decisions that could result in
concentrated local effects. This consequence is part of the benefit of the solution,
but FERC-based siting authority may swing the pendulum too far away from local
autonomy and alienate state and local regulators.345 The state-based reforms, on
the other hands, are on their own insufficient to address the nationwide shortage in
transmission and do not change the understandable incentives states have to protect
their own interests.
The best approach for solving the transmission federalism problem is to vest
siting authority over interstate transmission lines in RTOs or other regional
transmission planning entities created as a result of Order 1000.346 This approach
would build on the reforms made to regional planning and cost allocation in Order
1000347 and extend the advantages of those reforms to siting. And, because Order
1000 directs RTOs to consider state public policy needs in making planning
decisions, RTOs would already be able to consider those needs in making siting
decisions.
Vesting RTOs or regional planning entities with this power could occur in at
least two ways. First, Congress could delegate siting authority directly or delegate
the power to FERC (as in the complete preemption approach) but instruct FERC to
delegate such authority to regional entities. Second, state members of RTOs or
regional planning entities could voluntarily cede their inherent siting authority and
agree to be bound by RTO siting decisions. Conventional wisdom and the states’
protests in the ISO-NE Order 1000 compliance filing suggest that the latter option
is unlikely, and thus this solution would require Congressional action which, as
discussed above, is unlikely. However, some states at least may be willing to give
up their transmission siting authority if they received other benefits in return. For
instance, states like Maine with more renewable energy generation resources than
in-state demand for electricity produced by those resources may cede some
transmission siting authority for interstate lines, if doing so would make it more
likely that the transmission system would allow the state to export its renewable
energy. States with insufficient or inefficient renewable resources to meet RPS
goals may be inclined to delegate transmission siting authority, if doing so would
result in the ability to import renewable energy.
This approach combines the efficiency advantages of a preemptive approach
by mitigating state externalities in exercising siting authority, but would also, if
structured properly, allow for greater transparency and stakeholder input. Vesting
siting authority in RTOs or regional planning entities also allows for some
flexibility to account for regional differences. One concern, however, is that the
345. See Peskoe, supra note 303303, at 260-61.
346. Professors Klass and Wilson suggest a related proposal that states voluntarily form interstate
compacts which would have siting and permitting authority, as provided for in EPAct 2005. Klass &
Wilson, supra note 14, at 1867-68. As they note, however, no states have yet exercised this option.
Klass & Wilson, supra note 14, at 1867-68.
347. Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011). See supra Part III.
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same concerns FERC expressed in Orders 890 and 1000 about undue
discrimination and influence by public utility transmission providers in the RTO
process could arise in the context of siting decisions.348 This limited, regional
preemption approach might allow large incumbent transmission utilities to avoid
state regulators and seek approval for projects from the politically unaccountable
RTO.349 However, applying the strong reforms in Order 1000 related to fairness in
planning and cost-allocation to regional siting decisions could mitigate this
concern.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States faces a shortage in electricity transmission infrastructure,
not only to meet basic reliability standards and relieve congestion, but also to
implement renewable energy policies. The current federalism structure for
regulating electricity transmission contributes to this national problem. The federal
government exercises authority over the inherently interstate activity of electricity
transmission and wholesale transactions, but states continue to hold their traditional
authority over siting decisions. States and public utilities have interests that often
conflict with regional and national transmission needs.
To alleviate this problem, it is necessary to shift the balance of power between
the states and federal government over transmission siting. The question then
becomes how much shifting is sufficient to address the problem while also
maintaining a reasonable degree of state and local autonomy. Congress in EPAct
2005 attempted to tip the balance toward the federal government by granting FERC
backstop siting authority, but the limitations on this authority rendered the reform
insufficient. There are a number of proposals at the federal and states levels that
would mitigate the federalism problems in transmission siting, but a solution
focused at the regional level seems best suited to balance the need for regional
transmission development with the benefit of preserving state and local
participation.

348. Order 890, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266, 12,271 (Feb. 16, 2007); Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,845.
See Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public Interest in
the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 578592 (2007).
349. See ROSSI, supra note 13, at 220 (“Large transmitting utilities would be able to bypass the state
political process, in which they must participate as an interest group alongside other stakeholders,
including consumer and environmental groups, in favor of a regional coordinated solution of relatively
homogenous transmission-owning firms.”).

